carlodaffara.conecta.itgoogle » Open source software-based business models research Mon, 08 Apr 2013 14:58:40 +0000 en hourly 1
It could have been different: Android, Google and all that Tue, 12 Jul 2011 11:06:27 +0000 cdaffara If there’s one thing that is totally clear, is that Android is ravaging the smartphone market, and all those that are feeling the heat are trying to use the most innovative and transparent approach to stop it: sue Google and its partners out in the oblivion. Software patents, design patents, copyrights, plain trolling- anything goes if it can help in stop the Droid juggernaut. At the same time, Google is under attack for its delay in publishing the Honeycomb source code, attacked for the half-backed results that can be witnessed in some tablet products, all of this in an environment where Android phone makers are obtaining extraordinary revenues, in large part thanks to those contested products (Samsung comes to mind).

Of course, hindsight is 20/20 as they say, and it’s easy to “predict” that the extraordinary success of Android would have generated such a defensive attack. It is however at least predictable, given the extreme litigation of software companies, that patents would have been used as a blunt instrument to fend off competitors. Could things have been different? I believe so, and I also believe that Google made some errors in its decision, especially in trying to create a control point (the “Google experience”) instead of favoring a more long-term vision.

Let’s start from the beginning. Android is two things at once; from one side it is a collection of many, many different open source projects, some external, some Google-created, some heavily modified and adapted specifically for the purpose. There is a separate, private tree (at the moment the 3.x branch) that is also based on open source projects, but is at the moment internal to Google and the partners that decided to join its Open Handset Alliance. Some projects are clearly behind their open counterparts, especially WebKit, while at the same time maintaining substantial external off-tree patches that are extremely difficult to integrate like in the Linux Kernel. There is an additional layer of totally proprietary apps, that are installable only for those partners (and phones) that subjugate themselves to an additional set of requirements and licensing rules, something that for example caused lots of problems for Motorola and Google in the SkyHook lawsuit. This will probably continue, and will be the real battleground, given the fact that Android and iOS are clearly emerging as the leading platforms.

Could it have been different? I think so. And by releasing some degree of control, Google could have created a much safer and open environment, while sacrificing very little. Let’s start with the point that what Google really, really wants is an unencumbered rich internet-enabled platform, that is not constrained by third parties, and that it uses Google services. The reality is that Google lives off advertising (at the moment, at last) and is trying to expand it to other services, like enterprise mail, documents, and so on; there are two roads to do that: the first is to create a platform that is strongly tied to Google services, so that it is nearly impossible to escape its control. In doing so, however, you face the tension of the OEM and vendors that may want to switch services, or that want to push internally developed offerings. In this case, they will have nothing left to do but to go with the competition, or create their own variant (something that already happened) increasing the adoption costs.

The alternative is the “A rising tide lifts all boats” – make it a purely open source project, where there is a real distributed control, like Eclipse. Turn it to the Apache foundation. Make all the interested partners a part of the foundation or consortium, make the code public (with limited exceptions, like for prerelease hardware drivers) and try to track as much as possible the projects where you take things from. Apply a strict code contribution regime to strengthen your position against IP claims, and especially don’t turn it into a product. Yes, you read it properly- the code should be a strict open source project. This way, it would be extremely difficult for an external party to sue the “origin”, given the difficulties in identifying a directly derived infringing device; Google could have then (using this more sanitized and cleaner base) provided insurance through a third party for IP infringement claims, if the code base adopter would want to use such an opportunity (some may decide to fight on their own, of course). This implies that an Android OEM can substitute the Google services and use something else (that, by the way, is possible even now) but would have easily prevented most antitrust-based attacks. The purely open code base and the increased external participation would have further shortened the time-to-market for providing a new board to the marketplace, reduced adoption costs, and facilitated an external ecosystem of providers for Android based services.

Google could have at least avoided some of the worst blows, increased its credibility with the various OS communities, and reduced the cost of adopting Android for an OEM, pushing more and more the platform. This, in exchange for some of the tight control that currently Google exercise on the platform. Unfortunately, I think it’s too late for that; and we will still have to face the sad situation that the life of a mobile platform is dictated purely by judges.

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ChromiumOS: a look in the code, and in the model (updated) Tue, 24 Nov 2009 10:09:42 +0000 cdaffara The release of Google ChromiumOS was an event waited by industry analysts with significant anticipation, and the overall impression after the announcement was that it went out as a fizzle, and not a bang. Most comments were centered on the obvious shortcomings of this first pre-alpha release, the significant limits in the supported hardware, the reliance on networking for everything (especially the initial login), the over-reliance on Google services. And all the comments are right-and, at the same time, based on a general misperception of what can be a potential competitor for the most visible part of the IT infrastructure, namely the traditional desktop PC. I had the opportunity to explore the code, build my version, and in general to evaluate the release in the context of the UTAUT model of technology adoption, and I believe that the approach is sound and sensible, and will change the market even if it fails.

The first misconception is the idea that ChromiumOS was designed as a desktop OS competitor, despite the previous comments from Google spokespersons that the release would have been targeted towards a different market. The reality is that, even in ideal conditions and with technology prevalence (that is, the new technology is invariably and clearly superior to the old one) in presence of strong network effect and market prevalence NO alternative can supplant the incumbent in a short period of time, but can eventually grow its market in small percentage increments. This is especially true if the incumbent has pricing flexibility, that is it is possible to lower prices to fight back economic advantages, by moving the dead loss to some other market sector where there is less competition. This is what happened in the netbook market, with the possible loss of market space to Linux alternatives thwarted by lowering the pricing point of the offered operating system. Google makes with ChromiumOS a technological bet, that is a clear continuation of their overall strategy, and that has a serious potential to materialize.

It is not a desktop operating system. Desktop OS are full-featured, flexible, allow for unlimited installation of applications; on the other hand, ChromiumOS is a thin shell designed to run the Chrome browser as a single application. So, everyone expecting Google to save the idea of the Linux desktop has missed the fundamental point that it is not possible for anyone to fight for the desktop and win in a short amount of time, and without a massive monetary investment. But it is always possible to create a new market, and that’s exactly what Google is trying to do; similarly to when Apple launched the iPhone, very few believed that it would reach any substantial market share, forgetting that the iPhone was not a phone, but an execution platform – something different from all the previous smartphones, for which apps and web browsing were at most an afterthought.ChromiumOS resembles in this aspect Moblin (and shares much code with it) but in an even more radical way.

It requires little or no maintenance and support. What is the single highest source of costs for PCs? Management and support. OS patching and installation/reinstallation, fixing applications, installing and removing apps, checking for malware, identity management… the list can go on forever. The real innovation in ChromiumOS is the use of an upgradeable read-only code frame, clearly mimicking set-top boxes that can upgrade themselves OTA (over the air) for example from a satellite channel. ChromiumOS is capable of managing in a transparent and secure way this upgrade, handling securely interruptions and attacks. This, coupled with a totally encrypted local store, means that the hardware can be effectively thought as a purely ephemeral device that can substituted with limited configuration needs, and that large numbers of devices can be upgraded and managed without human intervention and in total security. Applications are embedded in web pages, and managed as web pages; so the maintenance and training requirements are limited.

It is not really tied into Google. Of course in this first release it heavily uses Google services for everything; but changing that is trivial. The authentication part is managed by a PAM module that can be easily swapped, and login completion (that actually turns your login name in a gmail account) is just a small modification of the SLiM login manager used by the OS to perform the initial login, and can be changed with a few lines of code. The same for the application list (the first icon on the top left of the screen), that is merely a hardwired URL – change it with your own portal address, and you get the same result without using Google. The only part that requires some work is the integration of Google SSO (through a complex cookie exchange mechanism); augmenting that with something like OpenSSO from Sun would not require more than a few days of work anyway.

It is not a SplashTop clone. There are several Linux-based instant-on environments, designed to be integrated inside of a flash BIOS; the most famous one is SplashTop, used in many motherboards and notebooks from Asus, Acer, HP, Sony and many others. The problem of this approach is that it is “fixed”: the image is difficult to update and upgrade, and this means that it rapidly loses appeal. ChromiumOS uses a trusted boot mechanism to ensure that upgrades are legitimate, but integrates it in a clean and smart way, making sure that the users will continuously be up to date.

It does require the net most of the time, but not always. The first login requires a working connection, but then the credentials are hashed and stored in a cache wallet, that allows to enter even in absence of a connection. If the pages allow for detached operation (using Gears, HTML5 persistent storage, or similar mechanisms) the system will work even without a connection. It is a stopgag solution, but is sensible: most of the time spent in desktop applications is centered on online services that are unusable without a connection, so it makes sense when considering the OS as something that is not competing in the same market as a traditional PC. Local, cached web applications may provide in the future more flexibility in this sense, but moch effort needs to be done to make it a worthwhile path. If we consider how people spend time on the PC, we can use the data from  Wakoopa, that ublished recently a measurement of time spent per application on Windows, OSX and Linux, and shows that for example on Windows the time is spent with:

  1. Firefox (28.71%)
  2. Internet Explorer (6.88%)
  3. Google Chrome (6.62%)
  4. Windows Explorer (5.92%)
  5. Windows Live Messenger (4.25%)
  6. Opera (2.97%)
  7. Microsoft Office Word (2.51%)
  8. Microsoft Office Outlook (2.22%)
  9. World of Warcraft (1.45%)
  10. Skype (1.30%)

Apart from Microsoft Word, no other application can be used without a connection; at the same time, most of the applications may be supplanted by future versions of web applications, if the evolution around HTML and related standards continue at the current pace. For games, up-and-coming standards like WebGL and O3D may provide this in a “clientless” way; this is similar to the Quake Live game, that at the moment requires an additional plug-in but that may be potentially recoded using only those standards.

It integrates digital identities better than anyone else. You login once-then, everything just works. Enterprise users with large scale SSO systems sometimes encounter this, but is not that common in consumer and smaller companies, and is a great productivity tool. It is just the beginning: more sophisticated user interfaces are needed (this one for example would be great), but many companies (including Microsoft) are making great progresses in this direction.

It introduces a different model. Desktop PC are flexible, adaptable, usable without connectivity, complex, fragile, difficult to manage. Thin (bitmap-based, like RDP or ICA)  clients are slightly easier to manage, require no support, require substantial infrastructure investments, cannot work detached, have marginally lower management costs. The model adopted by Google leverages the local computing power for rendering pages, reducing back-end costs; is simpler to manage, requires no support and can integrate through plug-ins (or browser functionalities) rich functionalities, like 3D (with WebGL and O3d) or native processing (through NaCL) but always within the context of web-delivered applications.

The future will be the final judge; after all, even if something is not successful directly, it may “seed” a future evolution that is capable of shaking the market substantially. The real impact of Negroponte’s OLPC was not the machine in itself (despite the boatloads of innovations contained within) but the re-framing of the netbook market; similarly, maybe it will be not ChromiumOS that will lead the change, but I believe that it is a bold statement – in fact, much bolder than the code that was released.

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