Archive for July 12th, 2011
If there’s one thing that is totally clear, is that Android is ravaging the smartphone market, and all those that are feeling the heat are trying to use the most innovative and transparent approach to stop it: sue Google and its partners out in the oblivion. Software patents, design patents, copyrights, plain trolling- anything goes if it can help in stop the Droid juggernaut. At the same time, Google is under attack for its delay in publishing the Honeycomb source code, attacked for the half-backed results that can be witnessed in some tablet products, all of this in an environment where Android phone makers are obtaining extraordinary revenues, in large part thanks to those contested products (Samsung comes to mind).
Of course, hindsight is 20/20 as they say, and it’s easy to “predict” that the extraordinary success of Android would have generated such a defensive attack. It is however at least predictable, given the extreme litigation of software companies, that patents would have been used as a blunt instrument to fend off competitors. Could things have been different? I believe so, and I also believe that Google made some errors in its decision, especially in trying to create a control point (the “Google experience”) instead of favoring a more long-term vision.
Let’s start from the beginning. Android is two things at once; from one side it is a collection of many, many different open source projects, some external, some Google-created, some heavily modified and adapted specifically for the purpose. There is a separate, private tree (at the moment the 3.x branch) that is also based on open source projects, but is at the moment internal to Google and the partners that decided to join its Open Handset Alliance. Some projects are clearly behind their open counterparts, especially WebKit, while at the same time maintaining substantial external off-tree patches that are extremely difficult to integrate like in the Linux Kernel. There is an additional layer of totally proprietary apps, that are installable only for those partners (and phones) that subjugate themselves to an additional set of requirements and licensing rules, something that for example caused lots of problems for Motorola and Google in the SkyHook lawsuit. This will probably continue, and will be the real battleground, given the fact that Android and iOS are clearly emerging as the leading platforms.
Could it have been different? I think so. And by releasing some degree of control, Google could have created a much safer and open environment, while sacrificing very little. Let’s start with the point that what Google really, really wants is an unencumbered rich internet-enabled platform, that is not constrained by third parties, and that it uses Google services. The reality is that Google lives off advertising (at the moment, at last) and is trying to expand it to other services, like enterprise mail, documents, and so on; there are two roads to do that: the first is to create a platform that is strongly tied to Google services, so that it is nearly impossible to escape its control. In doing so, however, you face the tension of the OEM and vendors that may want to switch services, or that want to push internally developed offerings. In this case, they will have nothing left to do but to go with the competition, or create their own variant (something that already happened) increasing the adoption costs.
The alternative is the “A rising tide lifts all boats” – make it a purely open source project, where there is a real distributed control, like Eclipse. Turn it to the Apache foundation. Make all the interested partners a part of the foundation or consortium, make the code public (with limited exceptions, like for prerelease hardware drivers) and try to track as much as possible the projects where you take things from. Apply a strict code contribution regime to strengthen your position against IP claims, and especially don’t turn it into a product. Yes, you read it properly- the code should be a strict open source project. This way, it would be extremely difficult for an external party to sue the “origin”, given the difficulties in identifying a directly derived infringing device; Google could have then (using this more sanitized and cleaner base) provided insurance through a third party for IP infringement claims, if the code base adopter would want to use such an opportunity (some may decide to fight on their own, of course). This implies that an Android OEM can substitute the Google services and use something else (that, by the way, is possible even now) but would have easily prevented most antitrust-based attacks. The purely open code base and the increased external participation would have further shortened the time-to-market for providing a new board to the marketplace, reduced adoption costs, and facilitated an external ecosystem of providers for Android based services.
Google could have at least avoided some of the worst blows, increased its credibility with the various OS communities, and reduced the cost of adopting Android for an OEM, pushing more and more the platform. This, in exchange for some of the tight control that currently Google exercise on the platform. Unfortunately, I think it’s too late for that; and we will still have to face the sad situation that the life of a mobile platform is dictated purely by judges.