Open source and certified systems


A recent white paper, published by the Election Technology Council (an industry trade association representing providers for over 90% of the voting systems used in the United States), analyses the potential role of open source software in voting systems, concludes that “it is.. premature. Given the economic dynamics of the marketplace, state and federal governments should not adopt unfair competitive practices which show preferential treatment towards open source platforms over proprietary ones. Legislators who adopt policies that require open source products, or offer incentives to open source providers, will likely fall victim to a perception of instituting unfair market practices.” (where do I have heard this? curious, sometimes, the deja vu feeling…)

The white paper however does contain some concepts that I have found over and over, the result of mixing the “legal” perspective of OSS (the license on which the software is released) with the “technical” aspects (the collaborative development model), arriving at some false conclusions that are unfortunately shared by many others. For this reason, I would like to add my perspective on the issue of “certified” source code and OSS:

  • First of all, there is no causal relation between the license aspect and the quality of the code or its certifiability. It is highly ironic that the e-voting companies are complaining of the fact that OSS may be potentially not tested enough for critical environments like voting, given the results of some testing on their own software systems: “the implementation of cryptographic protection is flawed..this key is hard-coded into the source code for the AV-TSx, which is poor security practice because, among other things, it means the same key is used in every such machine in the U.S … and can be found through Google. The result is that in any jurisdiction that uses the default keys rather than creating new ones, the digital signatures provide no protection at all.” “No use of high assurance development methods: The AccuBasic interpreter does not appear to have been written using high-assurance development methodologies. It seems to have been written according to ordinary commercial practices. … Clearly there are serious security flaws in current state of the AV-OS and AV-TSx software” (source: Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter, Wagner, Jefferson, Bishop). Of course, there are many other reports and news pieces on the general unreliability of the certified GEMS software, just to pick the most talked about component. The fact is that assurance and certification is a non-functional aspect that is unrelated to the license the software is released with, as certifications of software quality and adherence to high-integrity standards are based on design documents, the adherence to development standards, testing procedures and much more- but not licensing.
  • I have already written about our research on open source quality from the software engineering point of view, and in general it can be observed that open source development models tend to have an higher improvement in quality within a specific time frame when compared to proprietary software systems under specific circumstances (like a healthy contributor community).
  • It is possible to certify open source systems under the strictest certification rules, like the SABI “secret and below” certification, medical CCHIT, encryption FIPS standard, common criteria¬†Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4+ (and in one case, meet or exceed EAL5), civil engineering (where the product is used for the stability computations for EDF nuclear plants designs), avionics and ground-based high-integrity systems, like air traffic control and railrway systems (we explored the procedures for achieving certified status for pre-existing open source code in the CALIBRE project). Thus, it is possible to meet and exceed the regulatory rules for a wide spectrum of environments with far more stringent specifications than the current e-voting environment.
  • It seems that the real problem lies in the potential for competition from OSS voting systems: “over proprietary ones. Legislators who adopt policies that require open source products, or offer incentives to open source providers, will likely fall victim to a perception of instituting unfair market practices. At worst, policy-makers may find themselves encouraging the use of products that do not exist and market conditions that cannot support competition.” The reality is that there are some open source voting software (the white paper even lists some), and the real threat is the government to start funding those projects instead of buying proprietary combinations. This is where the vendors clearly show the underlying misunderstanding on how open source works: you can still sell your assembly of hardware and software (as with EAL, it is the combination of both that is certified, not the software in isolation) and continue the current business model. It is doubtful that the “open source community” (as mentioned in the paper) will ever certify the code, as it is a costly and substantial effort, exactly like no individual applied to EAL4+ certification for Linux (that requires a substantial amount of money).

The various vendors would probably do something better if they started a collaborative effort for a minimum-denominator system to be used as a basis for their system, in a way similar to that performed by mobile phone companies in the LiMo and Android projects, or through industry consortia like Eclipse. They could still be introducing differentiating aspects in the hardware and upper-layer software, while reducing the costs of R&D and improving the transparency of a critical component of our modern democracies.

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